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1An Application of Grounded Theory: A Study of European Integration
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the use of a methodological
technique (grounded theory) in relation to European integration theory.
This is accomplished through categorisation and process, in conjunction
with theoretical coding (open, axial and selective). Indeed, the paper
builds a substantive theory to enhance our understanding of
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism (pre-existing formal
theories). In the aftermath of the Single European Act (SEA), the
beginnings of the Single European Market (SEM) and the M astricht
Treaty it became evident that industries/sectors needed to involve
themselves in the creation of the European Union. This paper illustrates
the extent of industry/sector involvement through an empirical study of
European life insurance and in doing so investigates and clarifies a
number of theoretical propositions relating to the formal theories.
2INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to illustrate an application of grounded theory in the
context of European integration. Initially, it undertakes a comparative analysis of
Member State life insurance legislation and through induction, deduction and
verification formulates a matrix and model to illustrate decision-making
processes in European Union (EU) institutions. Furthermore, the paper develops
a substantive theory and illustrates the extent to which it relates to pre-existing
formal theories. Substantive theory emerges from the analysis of a “. . . particular
situational context”, whereas formal theory “. . . emerges from a study of
phenomenon under many different types of situations” (Corbin and Strauss,
1990; p 174). Substantive theory necessitates four central criteria. Fit,
comprehension, generality and control: First, theory should be induced from diverse
data and be faithful to reality (it should fit); secondly, the fit should be
comprehendable; thirdly, the data should be comprehensive and interpretations
conceptually wide (there should be generality); and finally, in relation to
generality, it should be made clear when conditions apply to specific situations
and phenomenon (there should be control) (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).
Initially, the paper discusses the underpinnings of grounded theory and
identifies the rationale for applying it to European integration. Secondly, the
means of data collection are indicated and linked to the methodology. Finally,
the paper provides a substantive theory based on the research findings. Indeed it
uses this theory to further analyse two pre-existing European integration
theories (intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism)
3GROUNDED THEORY AS METHODOLOGY
Grounded theory wishes to demote the idea that the discovery of relevant
concepts and hypotheses are a priori to research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser,
1978; Charmaz, 1983; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Corbin and
Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1994). Grounded theory posits
that theory is derived from data and cannot be divorced from the process by
which it is developed. Most hypotheses and concepts are generated and
interpreted in relation to the data throughout the research (Glaser and Strauss,
1967).
Charmaz (1983) reiterates Glaser and Strauss (1967) when she contends that data
collection and analysis are undertaken simultaneously, interpretation is formed
through data discovery and vice-versa. The approach allows for emerging ideas
because it provides for further data collection. It accepts that one of the main
strengths of the grounded theory approach is one where data and ideas are
derived through the research rather than through a priorism. Verification is
secondary to understanding processes, not simply the processes of the
phenomenon but by understanding that social life itself is a process. Data should
be analysed as it emerges and through coding,  “order created” (ibid).
AN APPLICATION OF GROUNDED THEORY
In general terms, “. . . (a)nalysis makes use of constant comparisons. As incidents
are noted, they should be continually compared against other incidents for
dissimilarities and likenesses” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 9). Initially, a
comparison of Member State life insurance legislation was undertaken and the
extent to which this legislation allowed trading freedom in the national life
insurance market identified (Oyen, 1990). This is a standard means of generating
4theory and is usually accomplished early in the study to put the “story straight”
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; pp 116-142). “Making
comparisons assists the researcher in guarding against bias . . . comparisons also
help to achieve greater precision (the grouping of like and only like
phenomenon)” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 9). Indeed, one is seeking
regularities, this also creates order and helps with data integration.
Data Sampling
Data sampling was based on the grounded theory technique of theoretical
sampling. Theoretical sampling is undertaken on the basis that “. . . concepts have
proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; p
176). Theoretical sampling involves three processes: open sampling which relates to
open coding; relational and variational sampling which is associated with axial
coding; and discriminate sampling which is linked to selective coding (coding
processes are discussed below).
Proven theoretical relevance identifies concepts that are significant enough to be
considered categories  “ . . . they are deemed significant because (1) they are
repeatedly present or notably absent when comparing incident after incident (2)
through coding procedures they earn the status of categories. . . . The aim of
theoretical sampling is to sample events, incidents, and so forth, that are
indicative of categories, their properties and dimensions, so that you can
develop and conceptually relate them” (ibid, p 177).
5Table. 1.
Data Collection Scheme
Survey A: Survey of European Union life insurance companies. Allows an
understanding of market environment perceptions from separate Member
States. Open sampling  and relational and variational sampling .
Survey B: Survey of UK insurance companies to ascertain interest group
utilisation. Discriminate sampling.
Interviews: The interviews are supplemented by survey B and provide an in-
depth understanding of the EU decision-making process with regard to the
Third Life Assurance Directive. Relational and variational sampling  and
discriminate sampling.
Observations and preliminary discussions: This incorporated three months in
Brussels working with a European political consultant (GJW), a period with
the European section of a UK company (Commercial Union) open discussions
and close contact with the Association of British Insurers (ABI). Open
sampling
Following an inductive analysis of the different Member States’ life insurance
legislation and a survey (survey A see below) of the European life insurance
industry, a regulatory environment matrix was created. This part of the of the
analysis illustrates open sampling where the aim is “. . . to uncover as many
potentially relevant categories as possible along with their properties and
dimensions” (ibid, p 181) and the beginnings of relational and variational sampling.
Indeed, survey A validates the relationships between the categories and
identifies processes. From this some propositions were formed and the sampling
gradually became specifically relational and variational (see Table One)
The sampling was undertaken purposefully which encompassed choosing
individuals and documentation that demonstrated variations in the categories
and what happened when change occurred. As with the coding (see below) the
distinction between relational and variational sampling and discriminate
6sampling became unclear. Discriminate sampling is direct and deliberate and is
indicated in the choice of interviewees and survey B (see Table One). “In
discriminate sampling, a researcher chooses the sites, persons and documents
that will maximise opportunities for verifying the story line and relationships
between categories” (ibid, p 187). Sampling in grounded theory studies is
concerned with the “. . . representativeness of concepts in their varying forms. In
each instance of data collection, we look for evidence of its significant presence
or absence, and ask why?” (ibid, p 190) (see Table One). Grounded theory
studies look “. . . for incidents and events that are indicative of phenomena”
(ibid). Indeed, they pursue density and “. . . the more interviews, observations
and documents obtained, then the more evidence will accumulate, the more
variations will be found, and the greater the density will be achieved. Thus there
will be wider applicability of the theory, because more and different sets of
conditions affecting phenomena are uncovered” (ibid pp 190-91).
Theoretical Coding
Theoretical coding is linked closely to the theoretical sampling and encompasses
the very basis of grounded theory. The essential relationship between data and
theory is a conceptual code. The code conceptualises the underlying patterns of
the data. “Thus, in generating a theory by developing the hypothetical
relationships between conceptual codes (categories and their properties) which
have been generated from the data as indicators, we discover a grounded
theory” (Glaser, 1978; p 55). There are three types of theoretical coding.
Open Coding
Open coding is closely linked to open sampling and provides the foundation of
the research process. “The goal of the analyst is to generate an emergent set of
7categories and their properties which fit, work and are relevant for integrating
theory. To achieve this goal the analyst begins with open coding” (Glaser, 1978;
p 56). Attention should be fixed on a category and the properties that emerge
continually coded and analysed: these are the initial basic steps. Ultimately, one
constantly compares and continually categorises. The qualitative data relating to
each regulatory environment was broken down in terms of open coding and
restructured initially on a table and later refined in a matrix.  The category of
'Regulatory Environment' emerged following an analysis of Member State
legislation and regulations (see Table Two). Through further research conceptual
labels emerged in terms of liberal, prescribed and state-controlled regulatory
environments and each of these was made up of the properties outlined (see Table
Two). A category is a “. . . classification of concepts. This classification is
discovered when concepts are compared one against the another and appear to
pertain to a similar phenomenon (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 61). Furthermore,
conceptual labels are placed “. . . on discrete happenings, events, and other
instances of phenomena” (ibid). Indeed, these concepts are made up of properties
and characteristics that are indicated by the overall category. Finally the Member
States are given dimensions through the “. . . location of properties along  a
continuum” (ibid), in this research a regulation table and matrix. This process
was pursued through the use of code, theoretical, operational notes and diagrams;
code notes illustrate separate types of legislation in the different Member States
and how aspects of the legislation link together and fluctuate under conceptual
labels; theoretical notes link different types of cultural existence to the conceptual
labels and questions how compromises takes place, whereas, the operational notes
illustrated the need for further research. The operational notes guided the research
in respect of; who to survey; the questions to be asked, who should be
interviewed and the structure the interviews should take. Overall, the research
was visually represented through diagrams each of which illustrated the
relationship between concepts. Indeed, the diagrams illustrate a “. . . visual sorting
8process that helps you identify how the categories are related to one another”
(ibid p 197).
Table 2
Regulatory/ Legislative
Environment Table
Regulatory
Environments
(CATEGORY)
Legislative/Regulatory
Stipulations
Member States
Liberal
(CONCEPTUAL
LABEL)
(PROPERTIES) (DIMENSIONAL
-ISATION)
1 Completely free market
Approval of Company
2 - 3 Solvency Margins
Policyholder protection
Evaluation of Liability
& Rates
Luxembourg
Netherlands
UK
3 - 4 Open Access to Insurance
Information Eire
Prescribed
5 - 6
7 - 8
Price Controls
Marketing Controls
Solvency Deposit
Policy Approval
Regulation of Contract
Belgium
Denmark
Spain
Germany
State-Controlled
9 - 10
10 - 11
12
State Controlled Companies
Contractual Obligation to
State
Intense Monitoring of
Companies
Proof of Ability
Total State Control
France
Italy
Portugal
Greece
Open coding was used to create a scale of one to twelve on which a totally liberal
regulatory environment is valued one and a completely state-controlled or
9nationalised regulatory environment is valued twelve. A prescribed regulatory
environment is considered not to be one of primarily self-regulation, nor is it
completely state-controlled: it is a market with tight government controls.  The
higher the number on the matrix the greater the regulation and state-control
indicated in the Member State's legislative system. Through further comparative
analysis and open coding each Member State was understood to be at some
point on the matrix scale (see Table Two below and  Life Insurance Regulation
Matrix One, Fig One).
Once this had been achieved further investigation was necessary and a survey of
the European life insurance sector was undertaken (survey A). In survey A, three
hundred questionnaires were sent to insurance companies in eight of twelve
Member States, (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain
and Eire). Four Member States were omitted mainly because of problems with
translation and difficulties in terms of acquiring addresses. The response rate
was 35-40% which are listed.  Survey A wished to illustrate the thoughts of the
Member States with regard to national life insurance regulation and the creation
of a SEM. It also aimed to determine the extent of liberality allowed within a
particular Member State, illustrate what the respondents considered to be the
optimum regulation for trading and the amount of legislation necessary to
enable this.
Survey A
A Survey of the European Life Insurance Industry
(1)  How liberal or state controlled is your national life insurance market?
(2) Where would you place the Single European Market (SEM) life insurance sector in respect of
regulatory freedom?
(3) What type of regulatory environment do you consider that the SEM should be to allow your company
its greatest advantage?
(4) What type of regulatory environment do you consider the SEM in life insurance should be to allow the
greatest consumer protection?
(5) What type of regulatory environment do you consider the SEM in life insurance should be to allow the
greatest consumer choice?
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Survey A was used instead of interviews, because a broad sample was required
to add to and verify the regulatory environment matrix which encompassed the
industry’s understanding of the SEM and the EU. Indeed, the survey provided
an understanding of the differences in Member State normative thinking in
respect of life insurance regulation and raised the question of where and how
compromise takes place in the creation of the SEM.
FIG 1            Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One.
       Liberal              Prescribed             Nationalised
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11           12
Lux
UK
Neth
Eire
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Italy
France
Portugal
Greece
CCP
CCP = Compromised Convergence Point
Matrix compiled from an analysis of Munich Re: (1988), Financial Times (1992),
Sigma Re: (1988-93), Pool (1991) BIIC & CEA Working Papers.
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The Matrix was subsequently revised taking into consideration the survey
results which also raised further questions (See Life Insurance Regulation Matrix
Two, Fig Two).
FIG 2
1          2         3         4        5         6         7         8         9         10         11         12
Lux
UK
Netherlands
Eire
Belgium
Spain
Germany
Denmark
Italy
France
Portugal
Greece
CCP
CCP = Compromised Convergence Point 
 
Matrix compiled from an analysis of Munich Re: (1988), Financial Times (1992),  
Sigma Re:  (1988-93), Pool (1991), BIIC & CEA Working Papers and survey of EU life 
insurance industry.
Liberal Prescribed Nationalised
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix Two
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Table. 3.
       Regulation Scale
1-2 = self-minimal regulation
3-4 = minimal regulation; independent regulatory bodies
5-6 = moderately regulated without state ownership
7-8 = highly regulated without state ownership
9-10 = highly regulated with minimal state ownership
11-12 = highly regulated with a profusion of state control.
This process subsequently set up a number of questions which were investigated
through semi-formal interviews with key individuals in the creation of the Third
Life Assurance Directive and through observations of the European decision-
making process. These gave an understanding of the political process and
enabled further construction of a theoretical model. Table One summarises the
data collection process in terms of three surveys, the interviews and
observations.
Axial Coding
Axial coding involves bringing the analysis together, creating a whole. It
indicates the overall system of which the categories created through open coding
are part. In this study axial coding is illustrated through the interviews  and
subsequent European Decision-Making Model1 (see Figure Three)
                                         
1 There are two general directions that could be taken regarding decision-making procedures identified on
the model. These are indicated by arrows A and B; process A considers that demands are formulated
through the national legislature prior to formulation at the EU level; whereas route B illustrates demand
formulation being compromised at the EU level prior to the involvement of the national legislature. Route
A is a stronger intergovernmental approach whereas route B illustrates more of a neo-functional process.
Of course, the situation is not as clear-cut as depicted and elements of both routes were in use but in
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FIG 3
THE EUROPEAN DECISION-MAKING MODEL
(A): 
Demands which are 
processed through 
the National legislature 
prior to formulation at 
the European level.
 
(B): 
Demands formulated at 
the European level then  
put to both the European 
and National legislation.
COMMISSION PARLIAMENT COUNCIL
Initiation Amendment Decision-MakingA
B
A
B
A B B A B A B
Consensus
EUROPEAN INTEREST 
          GROUP 
      Formulation B
NATIONAL 
LEGISLATURE 
Formulation A
A
B
Interpretation
Interactory 
  Process
COURT OF 
  JUSTICE
Ratification
B A
ABI GDV FFSA
UK GERMANY FRANCE
INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
LUXEMBOURG
(NATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS)
                                                                                                             
general the interviews emphasised route B. The interviews illustrate that agreement is sought and usually
accomplished at the European interest group level in tandem with the Commission and Parliament.
Indeed, if the legislation is being negotiated by the industry through interest group involvement with a
supranational institution EU decision-makers, the research has uncovered elements of neo-functionalism.
If a compromise is not reached at the EU level, then each Member State industry would pursue its own
ideal market type (as indicated by the matrix) and compromise would be difficult if not impossible to
achieve. To enable successful acceptable legislation at the EU level the interviews and surveys illustrate
that both neo-functional and intergovernmental processes need to be at work. This is taken further by the
Spillover Model.
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It is inclusive of:
(a) Causal conditions.
(b) Phenomenon.
(c) Context.
(d) Intervening conditions.
(e) Action/Interaction.
(f) Consequences.
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990; pp 96-97).
An application of axial coding in this research was identified through:
(a) Membership of the EU.
(b) The creation of the SEM and legislation to create regulatory environments.
(c) The European decision-making process.
(d) The harmonisation of different Member State concepts of market conditions (life
insurance industries).
(e) Interaction between Member States and decision-making bodies.
(i) Goal orientation (purposeful) market as near to one's own. Interaction between
Member states at the European interest group level.
(ii) Evolutionary changes (processional) compromised issues. Interaction between interest
groups and the EU decision-making institutions.
(f) Outcomes or the creation of a harmonised SEM in the life insurance sector; a move
towards greater integration in the EU.
In more specific terms, the causal conditions and phenomenon are membership of
the EU and the on going evolution of the SEM. The context is the possible
transfer of sovereignty in terms of the decision-making process and market
control. The intervening conditions are the necessities of harmonisation and the
15
implications this has for integration; such is illustrated through the compromises
made by Member States in respect of regulatory environments. This portrays the
need for action/interaction between Member States and the European decision-
making institutions in terms of the evolutionary changes taking place i.e. the
need to harmonise and create a SEM and the goal oriented interaction of creating
legislation as close to one's own as possible. Finally, the consequences are the
creation of the SEM through harmonisation and a shift toward closer union and
greater European integration.
Glaser considers that  axial coding “. . . undermines and confuses the very
method that he (Strauss) is trying to build” (Glaser, 1992; p 61). This process
forces the data and negates theoretical coding. The grounded theorist should
code categories and properties and allow theoretical codes to emerge where they
will. Strauss and Corbin consider that axial coding allows a more focused means
of discovering and relating categories. This research uses Corbin and Strauss'
axial coding as a guide into which emerge the specific categories to the study i.e.
those categories outlined above.
The Interviews & Observations
Interviews were used to investigate decision-making processes at the European
level. Over an eight week period working for a political lobbying company (GJW
Political Consultants) in Brussels, the author was able to observe the decision-
making processes. Interviews were undertaken with the Commission; insurance
interest groups; the UK Permanent Representative (Finance Committee), and
lobbyists. Further interviews were undertaken in Paris and the UK.
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
The interviews were conducted on a semi-formal basis and centred around 10-12 core questions these
were;
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(1) What are the major functions of the CEA/BIPAR/ABI/the Commission/the Council/National
Supervisors and how do these fit with each other at;
(A) The EU level.
(B) The national level.
(2) To what extent are decisions made with interest group/COREPER/Commission/National Supervisor
in-put.
(3) Is it interest groups, national supervisors, the Council of Ministers or the Commission that define
decision parameters.
(4) Does the Council, the Commission, national legislatures and interest groups reach a compromise prior
to a decision reaching the Council.
(5) Does an interaction exist between the Council/the Commission/national supervisors and specific
interest groups at a national and European level.
(6) How does the Council/national supervisor know what to insist upon in respect of national interest.
(7) Does an interaction exist between interest groups/Commission/Council/national supervisor and the
Insurance Committee
(8) Are different Member States looking for  specific types of life insurance regulatory environments for
the SEM which is different from other member states.
(9) Are there differences between the;
(a) The French ideal
(b) The German  ideal
(c) The Dutch  ideal
(d) The UK  ideal
(e) The Italian  ideal
Please illustrate these differences.
How does your market ideal fit into these?
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups prior to the Commission
initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an interaction between the interest group at the European
level and the Commission which takes into consideration a compromise reached by the member state
interest groups i.e. ABI through membership of the European interest group CEA/BIPAR.
(11) Where possible have compromises been reached between the Council, the Commission and Parliament
before the final negotiations to enable a more efficient means of decision making?
(12) What takes precedence in the formulation of a Directive Member State or sector interests?
Each interview attempted to look at the same phenomenon from a different
perspective and enable data ‘saturation’. The interviews were conducted
between surveys A and B and indicated the need for survey B (see Data
Collection Scheme). The need for legislative convergence is indicated by the
open coding process, the surveys and subsequent matrices. Additionally, the
interviews and survey B allow the construction the European Decision- Making
Model. Indeed, through the use of both the matrix and the model, a substantive
theory is constructed that illustrates convergence and harmonisation procedures
in the EU. Ultimately, a substantive theory of European integration is illustrated
that has aspects of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (formal
theories) (see the substantive theory below).
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Survey B
A Survey of the UK Insurance Industry regarding Interest Group Use.
(1) Your company used organised interest groups at the European level i.e. the CEA in the formulation of
the third life directive.
(2) Your company used organised interest groups at the national level i.e. the ABI in the formulation of
the third life directive.
(3) Your company uses organised interest groups at the European level for most European issues.
(4) Your company subscribes to a European interest group.
(5) Your company subscribes to a national interest group.
(6) Your company lobbies European institutions when its European interests are affected.
(7) Your company lobbies the national government when European interests are affected.
(8) Your company primarily uses interest groups to lobby on its behalf at the European level.
(9) Your company primarily uses interest groups to lobby on its behalf at the national level.
(10) Your company prefers to use interest groups at the European level because this allows European
industry/sector wide compromises.
(11) Your company prefers to use interest groups at the national level because this allows nation-wide
sector compromises.
Selective Coding
“Selective coding is the process by which all categories are unified around a core
category” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 15). The core category in this study is
European integration. The SEM in life insurance and regulatory environments
incorporate “. . . other categories and stand in relationship to the core category as
conditions, action/interactional strategies, or consequences” (ibid). The selection
of data and the creation of other categories have been processed with the core
category in mind. “The core category represents the central phenomenon of the
study. It is identified by asking questions such as; what is the main analytical
idea presented in this research? What does all the action/interaction seem to be
about?” (ibid). The answers to which are: the integration processes at work in the
EU, how Member States’ action/interaction create the SEM and how this adds
impetus to European integration. These areas are identified and unified through
axial coding. “During axial coding, one begins to notice certain patterns . . . and
a certain amount of integration naturally occurs” (ibid p 130). Indeed, a network
of conceptual relationships already exists. Of course, the network may be unclear
but these can be refined during selective coding. “It is very important to identify
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these patterns and to group the data accordingly, because this is what gives the
theory specificity” (ibid). To clarify connections in the network grounded theory
uses “ . . . a combination of inductive and deductive thinking, in which we move
between asking questions, generating hypotheses, and making comparisons”
(ibid, p 131). Selective coding integrates the research, it puts the story straight,
provides analysis, identifies the core category and illustrates how major
categories relate, both to it and to each other. This can be further developed
through understanding process.
Process: Self-Interest & Social Mutuality
Process is also be built into the theory. “Process analysis can mean breaking a
phenomenon down into stages, phases, or steps. Process may also denote
purposeful action/interaction that is not necessarily progressive, but changes in
response to prevailing conditions” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 10).
Consequently, when the life insurance sector and EU decision-making
institutions are analysed, processes and action/interaction are identified through
interest groups. And the changes and compromises made by interest groups and
sectors are interpreted in relation to the changes the SEM has brought and is
bringing about.
The analysis identified process in the Member State markets because of their
membership of the EU and the creation of a piece of legislation that would
harmonise the different regulatory environments. This would create the need for
compromise; and the research sought to identify why and how these
compromises and changes would take place. Consequently, the European
Decision-Making Model (Fig Three) was constructed through semi-formal
interviews, observations and a further survey (Survey B see Data Collection
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Scheme Table One). The surveys assisted in generating substantive theory.
Survey A was used as secondary analysis in relation to the open coding of
Member State regulatory structures. Indeed, it  added to and verified the initial
open coding. “Comparative analysis requires secondary analysis when
populations from several different studies are compared, such as different
nations or factories” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 188). Survey B is used in the
same way with regard to the European Decision-Making Model.
Through compromise at the European level, self-interest  is sacrificed for the
welfare of Europe in general even though this is initially in a limited area2.
However, ultimately welfare is realised throughout Europe in terms of peaceful
co-existence and economic expansion. As Scheingold indicated “. . . integration
was good by definition since it was directed at economic reconstruction and
permanent reconciliation between nations whose conflicts had led to bloody
wars. . . . A ‘United States of Europe’ seemed almost by definition likely to serve
the cause of a peaceful and prosperous future” (Scheingold, 1971; p 30).
SUBSTANTIVE AND FORMAL THEORY
Glaser and Strauss (1967) considered that grounded theory was concerned with
two types of theory: substantive and formal (conceptual); theory allows
hypotheses and substantive concepts to emerge from the data, so analysis may
identify concepts relevant to understanding the data. They emphasised that
theory generation was accomplished through the collection, coding and analysis
of the data and that these three operations were done together as far as was
possible. These areas should interact continually, from the beginning of the
investigation to its end. The separation of these areas hinders theory generation
                                         
2 Welfare in this paper is based on the concept of the social contract. As in, the need for people to work
and exist together so they are able to pursue their self interest. It is based on Kant's civic constitution. It is
giving up one's individual freedom in certain areas for the welfare or general good of all.
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whereas set ideas stifle it. In this study the aim is to generate a substantive
theory in relation to neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, (formal
theories) and questions these with regard to their applicability as theories of
European integration.
Formal Theories
In the context of this paper and its study of the EU decision-making processes,
formal theory is broadly European integration theory and, specifically, neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalism is one of
incremental integration through the transfer of allegiance to a supranational
body, the use of interest groups and the concept of spillover. On the other hand,
intergovernmentalism considers that the nation-state is the main impetus behind
the European integration process. The substantive element of the theory
formulated in this paper measures the extent formal theories empirically adhere
to these propositions.
The empiricism is bound up in the changes that are taking place as the EU
evolves, especially now that the process has intensified. Indeed, the idea of neo-
functional transformation has re-emerged (in the aftermath of the SEA the SEM,
the Maastricht Treaty and EMU) and the evolving EU is where the process may
be further identified and best observed.
Neo-functionalism is ground in Kantian political thought and considered peace
oriented in terms of a specific region. It is a peaceful process directed at a
peaceful end and wishes to ensure a ‘civic constitution’ under the auspices of
perpetual peace (Kant 1992).  Neo-functionalism proposes that the EU is a
supranational entity which through its growing authority encourages the
transferral of allegiance away from national institutions and towards the
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European. On the other hand, intergovernmentalism argues that the nation-state
is the main impetus and will remain so.
“A substantive theory generated from the data must be formulated, in order to
see which of diverse formal theories are, perhaps, applicable for furthering
additional substantive formulations” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 34). This
illustrates that theories are never complete but processes in themselves. In this
context, one may question the extent to which intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism may be labelled formal theories, and the extent to which they are
substantive theories of realism and functionalism. Neither has emerged from
studies under different types of situations i.e. integration processes external to
western Europe. However, one may consider that all theory is open ended
because as new categories or properties are generated, there is a place for them
in the scheme. This research wished to investigate, verify, question and ideally,
further understand European integration through the construction of a
substantive theory and an analysis of neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism.
The Substantive Theory
The substantive theory is built through coding, categorisation and process. The
matrices provide the basis of the substantive theory in that they acknowledge
that separate Member States pursue different regulatory regimes. This sets up
the problem of understanding how compromise is reached. The interviews,
observations and survey B further construct the substantive theory. A
substantive theory that has implications for the formal theories of
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism (in terms of spillover,
supranationality and interest group utilisation).
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The substantive theory was constructed through an induction/deduction
process. The inductive element encompassed the creation of a matrix through
coding and categorisation. This was added to and verified by  survey A, this led
to a number of deductions. Through axial coding elements of the research were
linked up around the core category and through selective coding an the
European Decision-Making Model was formulated. In practical terms, this
meant that through the construction of the matrix, we discover that different
Member States pursue different concepts of a regulatory environment. This leads
the paper to the question: do the Member States compromise their differences
and if they do how is this achieved? The interviews provided an understanding
of how compromise is pursued and indicated a generalisation. Indeed, the
generalisation is part of and extends the substantive theory, the basis of which is
as follows:
(a) Sectors/industries (in this context the insurance industry) are involved in the
construction of the SEM and furthering European integration.
(b) They participate in the decision-making process in a number of ways but primarily
through the use of interest groups.
(c) Each Member State sector/industry compromise their own interest at the EU level
(this is achieved through national interest groups e.g. (ABI and European interest groups
e.g. CEA).
(d) Compromise between the EU wide sector/industry and the Commission is reached
primarily through European interest groups.
(f) Compromise between the EU legislative bodies, national legislatures and interest
groups takes place throughout the creation of legislation.
(g) There is a shift in allegiance from the national legislature to the EU with regard to
certain issues. However, the Member States still play an important role in the decision-
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making process. Indeed, there has been a shift toward joint sovereignty in the creation of
EU legislation. Through this process European integration is intensified.
(h) European integration is given impetus by economic industries/sectors pursuing their
self-interest in the creation of EU legislation. However, this allows welfare for Europeans
in terms of greater prosperity and peaceful co-existence. Again, this intensifies European
integration.
The substantive theory has been constructed through the following procedures.
First, the grounded theory techniques of theoretical sampling and coding and
categorisation. Secondly the accumulation of data based on two major surveys,
an interview programme and observations (see the Data Collection Table).
Finally, a generalisation which illustrates the accumulation of the process and
indicates how each piece of legislation created between the Member State
industries/sectors, the EU decision-makers and Member State governments
accumulates and intensifies European integration (see the Spillover Model, Figs
Four and Five). Indeed, the Spillover Model illustrates an interaction between
neo-functional and intergovernmental processes of spillover3.
                                         
3 Spillover is observed in terms of the need for further legislation in the European life insurance industry
and the industries (non-life insurance,  banking and pensions) and sectors (capital) related to it. It is
suggested that EMU will intensify the need for harmonisation in these areas and it is in this context that
intergovernmental and neo-functional processes can be observed. In intergovernmental terms spillover can
be seen the creation of the Treaties and agreements that further integration i.e ECSC, EEC, Enlargement,
Direct Elections, SEA, SEM, EMU. While in neo-functional terms spillover may be observed in three areas
(a) in one industry (the insurance industry) vertical spillover; (b) spillover from industry to industry (from
insurance to banking) horizontal specific spillover. More tentatively one may posit spillover from sector to
sector (from sevices to capital) horizontal general spillover .
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THE SPILLOVER MODEL (FIGS 4 & 5)
FIG 4
X 1
X 2
X 3
X 6
X 4              
X 5                                      X 8
 X 7
INSURANCE
Intergovernmental 
       Spillover
NEO-FUNTIONAL SPILLOVER
VERTICAL SPILLOVER (WITHIN SAME INDUSTRY)
EPU ?
EMU                        1999
SEM                          1992
SEA/QMV               1987
Direct Elections        1979
EEC/Euratom          1957
ECSC                         1951
Neo-Functional Spillover. Vertical Spillover (Within Same Industry)
1. Re-insurance Directive
2. Co-insurance Directive
3. First Life Insurance Directive. 79/267/EEC
4. Second Life Insurance Directive. 90/ 619/EEC
5. Third Life Insurance Directive. 92/96/EEC
6. First Non-Life Insurance Directive. 73/239/EEC
7. Second Non-Life Insurance Directive. 88/357/EEC
8. Third Non-Life Insurance Directive. 92/49/EEC
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FIG 5
X 1
X 2
X 3
X 6
X 4              
X 5                  X 8
 X 7
INSURANCE
Intergovernmental 
       Spillover
NEO-FUNTIONAL SPILLOVER HORIZONTAL SPECIFIC 
EPU ?
EMU                        1999
SEM                          1992
SEA/QMV               1987
Direct Elections        1979
EEC/Euratom          1957
ECSC                         1951
BANKING PENSIONS
               SPILLOVER (INDUSTRY TO INDUSTRY 
                            (WITHIN SAME SECTOR)
X 12
X 11
X 10
X 9
X 13 X 14
X 15
Horizontal Specific Spillover (Industry to Industry Within the Same Sector)
X1. Re-insurance Directive 64/225/EEC
X2. Co-insurance Directive 78/473/EEC
X3. First Life Insurance Directive. 79/267/EEC
X4. Second Life Insurance Directive. 90/ 619/EEC
X5. Third Life Insurance Directive. 92/96/EEC
X6. First Non-Life Insurance Directive. 73/239/EEC
X7. Second Non-Life Insurance Directive. 88/357/EEC
X8. Third Non-Life Insurance Directive. 92/49/EEC
X9. First Banking Directive. 77/780/EEC
X10. Second Banking Directive. 89/646/EEC
X11. Capital Adequacy Directive. 93/6/EEC
X12. Solvency Ration Directive. 94/7/EEC
X13. Accounts Directive for Banks and Other Credit Institutions. 86/635/EEC
X14. Directive Concerning Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Occupational Social Security Schemes. 86/378/EEC
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X15. Directive Concerning the Rights of Residence for Self-Employed Persons Who have Ceased
Occupational Activity. 90/365/EEC
The substantive theory is illustrated by the following:
Regulatory/Legislation Environment (Table 2)
Regulation Scale (Table 3)
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One (Figure 1)
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix Two (Figure 2)
The European Decision-Making Model (Figure 3)
The Spillover Model (Figures 4 and 5).
If sectors/industries (in this context, the insurance industry) are involved in the
construction of the SEM and furthering European integration. Then the process
is not purely intergovernmental. However, as the Council of Ministers passes
legislation, an intergovernmental element still remains. The substantive theory
considers that industries/sectors compromise their own interest at the EU level
(this is achieved through national interest groups e.g. the ABI and European
interest groups e.g. the CEA). This too illustrates aspects of neo-functionalism as
the use of interest groups (sub-national actors) particularly European interest
groups is central to a neo-functional understanding of European integration.
Compromise between the EU-wide sector/industry and the Commission is
reached primarily through European interest groups. The use of EU-wide
interest groups is emphasised in the interaction and compromises that are
reached between the EU legislative bodies and the EU-wide interest groups in
the creation of European legislation. However, the national interest groups still
play an important role in the process by reporting back to national governments.
In general the substantive theory concluded that there was a shift in allegiance
from the national legislature to the EU with regard to certain issues. However,
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the Member States still played an important role in the decision-making process.
Indeed, there has been a shift toward joint sovereignty in the creation of EU
legislation. This is illustrated through the concepts of intergovernmental and
neo-functional spillover; the former creates the environment through the treaties
whereas the latter pushes this forward through the need for industries/sectors to
ensure their advantage in the evolving EU. This process initiates a shift away
from economic interdependence toward an intensification of European
integration, a move away from an intergovernmental process of integration
toward a neo-functional.
CONCLUSION
This study illustrates grounded theory techniques in the following ways. Firstly,
a comparative analysis through the open coding of individual Member States'
life insurance legislation and regulatory regimes; formulates a
regulatory/legislation table and a regulation matrix. Further coding through a
survey of Member State insurance industries refined and verified the matrix.
These procedures illustrated the need for a further survey which allowed data
saturation and an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. Indeed, this
investigation raised questions with regard to how legislative differences between
Member States may be resolved. Secondly, through axial coding and an
interview programme, process was identified and illustrated through the
European Decision-Making Model (Fig Three).
Thirdly, the selective coding process is illustrated by the matrix and the model
fitting together around the core category of European integration through the
creation of the SEM and European Union. Axial coding draws all parts of the
analysis together: it is the pivot or the axis of theory building. This is illustrated
through the European Decision-Making Model. Finally a  generalisation is made
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regarding this understanding of legislation formulation which indicates both
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism in the process of European
integration. In this context, substantive theory is formulated in relation to the
formal theories of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Through
grounded theory techniques a substantive theory is constructed which furthers
our understanding of European integration and the evolving European Union.
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